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Abstract 
The overall gender wage gap fell from .31 to .15 between 1986 and 2003 following the 
transition to a free market in Hungary. During the same time period, firms faced increased 
competition from both new domestic and foreign firms due to the rapid liberalization 
measures implemented by the government. Becker’s (1957) model of employer taste 
discrimination implies that employers that discriminate against women may be forced out of 
the market by competition in the long run, leading to a fall in the gender wage gap. I test this 
implication using data from the Hungarian Wage and Earnings Survey covering 1986-2003. I 
estimate the effect of variation in various measures of product market competition, including 
trade variables, on the within-firm endowment-adjusted gender wage gap, making use of the 
fact that I am able to follow firms over time. The estimates show a significant negative 
relationship between product market competition and the within-firm gender wage gap.  
 
JEL: J31, J71, P20 
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 A verseny növekedésének hatása a női-férfi 
bérkülönbségre a magyar 
munkapiacon 1986 és 2003 között 
Lovász Anna 
Összefoglaló 
 
Magyarországon a teljes női-férfi bérkülönbség 0,31-ről 0,15-re csökkent a rendszerváltást 
követően. Az időszak alatt - a jelentős és gyors piaci liberalizációnak köszönhetően - a cégek 
jelentősen megnövekedett versennyel néztek szembe mind a hazai, mind a nemzetközi 
piacokon. 
Becker 1957-es munkáltatói diszkriminációs modelljének következtetése szerint az olyan 
piacokról, ahol megnövekszik a verseny, hosszú távon kiszorulnak a diszkrimináló cégek, 
ezáltal csökken a női-férfi bérkülönbség.  
A tanulmány célja az egyes piacok versenyszintjeinek változása, valamint a piacokon belül 
dolgozó nők és férfiak közötti bérkülönbségek alakulása közötti összefüggés vizsgálata a 
Magyar Foglalkoztatási és Bértarifa révén.  
Az eredmények alàtàmasztjàk Becker következtetését a verseny anti-diszkriminàciós hatàsàt 
illetően. A verseny belföldi piaci koncentráció, valamint piaci import és export hànyadok 
révén mért, iparágakon belül becsült 
hatása negatív és szignifikàns. 
 
Tárgyszavak: Tranzíció, munkerőpiac, bérkülönbségek, diszkrimináció
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a well-documented decline in the overall gender wage gap in Hungary during 
the transition from the socialist system to a free market economy. The average wage of 
women working in the private sector was 68 percent of men’s in 1989, while by 1999 it had 
reached 82 percent.1 Similar tendencies were observed in the other transitional countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe2, seemingly contradicting one of the alleged achievements of 
socialism: gender equality in the labor market. Several studies have sought to explain the 
reasons behind this apparent beneficial effect of the transition to a free market on women’s 
relative wages. The results paint a more ambiguous picture than suggested by this statistic 
alone, bringing attention to some of the possible drawbacks of market liberalization on the 
relative job market situation of women in transitional economies, for example, 
disproportionate job losses of the low-skilled.3  
A possibility for a more positive explanation underlying the observed decline in the wage 
gap is suggested by Becker’s (1957) model of employer taste discrimination, which implies 
that in the long run, increased competition may act as a downward force on the wage gap by 
reducing employers’ ability to discriminate against women and other minorities.  Employers 
that pay male employees a wage premium in order to indulge discriminatory tastes, thus 
accruing additional costs, are unable to compete with others who do not have such 
preferences as the opening of the product market to new entrants forces a move towards 
more efficient production. All else equal, firms in less competitive product markets should 
exhibit higher levels of employer discrimination since rents are available for indulging such 
tastes. The model thus implies a negative correlation between the level of product market 
competition and employer taste discrimination, and highlights the positive role of 
competition in achieving equality in the labor market. 
As a consequence of the rapid liberalization measures implemented in Hungary following 
the transition in 1990,4 the level of competition in its markets increased significantly within a 
few years. Firms faced competition from domestic entrants, foreign companies, and in the 
                                                 
1 Source: Wage and Earnings Survey of the National Employment Office of Hungary 
2 Brainerd (2000) found decreasing male-female wage gaps in Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Estonia, East Germany, and Slovakia, but an increase in the gap in countries of the former Soviet Union. See 
also Newell and Reilly (2001), and Ogloblin (1999). 
3 Hunt (2002) found that over half of the decline in the gender wage gap in East Germany was due to exits from 
employment of the low-skilled, who were disproportionately women. 
4 The Appendix provides a summary of major market reforms in Hungary during and following the transitional 
period. 
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 form of imports.5 Employers had to adapt quickly to the new, more competitive environment 
by increasing efficiency, which may explain some of the drop in the overall gender wage gap 
through a fall in employer discrimination. The rapid and extensive economic changes and the 
suitability of the data that is available make the transition in Hungary an ideal setting for a 
test of this implication of Becker’s model. Hungary is also well-suited to this analysis due to 
the fact that it abandoned central planning, including strict wage grids seen in other 
communist countries, as early as 1968.6 This means we are able to observe employer level 
wage discrimination prior to the transition, allowing us to study of the effect of changes in 
market competition on such discrimination. 
In this paper, I conduct an empirical test of Becker’s implication by capturing the effects 
of the variation in the competitive environment faced by employers over time on the wage 
outcomes of female workers relative to male workers at their firms. The data used comprises 
a large sample of workers and firms drawn from the Hungarian Wage and Earnings Survey 
(WES)7, a matched employer-employee dataset that covers the pre- and post-transition time 
period from 1986 to 2003. The size of the data, covering roughly 90,000 workers and 3000 
firms each year, and the length of the time covered give a unique opportunity for determining 
the relationship between competition and discrimination in the long run. The fact that the 
WES matches workers to firms, and that it is a panel dataset in terms of firms leads to many 
improvements over previous studies that used industry or firm level data alone. The worker 
variables available in the data allow me to control for basic worker characteristics which 
determine productivity, while the firm level variables can capture firm-specific 
characteristics. Compared to studies that use a single year of data, I am able to estimate the 
effect of changes in competition levels within industries over time, which mitigates the 
possible problem of unobserved characteristics of industries. The large size of the WES 
sample allows me to test the implication using a larger number of observations than used in 
previous studies.  
The empirical approach used in this paper is comprised of two stages, using a weighting 
procedure based on Wooldridge (2003). First, I estimate a within-firm gender wage gap 
separately for each year of the data, while controlling for observable worker characteristics, in 
order to obtain the within-firm adjusted gender wage gap, an upper bound for employer 
                                                 
5 The number of registered economic organizations increased from 391 thousand to 1.1 million by 1998, and 
eighty percent of the GDP was produced by the private sector. Foreign direct investment streamed into the 
country, totaling roughly sixty billion dollars between 1989-1998. (GKI) 
6 Koltay (2002) states that although wage-setting following the transition was theoretically based on the principle 
of bargaining freedom, in reality, employers’ decisions and the impact of market forces played the most 
important role. 
7 The WES dataset is collected by the Hungarian National Employment Office, and was provided for use in this 
research by the Economics Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
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 discrimination.8 I then test whether higher levels of competition in the firms’ product 
markets, measured by various competition variables, are correlated with lower wage gaps 
within firms. A crucial issue in performing this test is the accurate measurement of 
competition faced by firms. I address this issue by carefully determining the level of 
industrial aggregation to be used in calculating competition measures, and by constructing a 
variety of measures suggested in previous literature to fully capture the level of competition 
in the relevant market of the firms. The relevant market must include competition from both 
domestic and foreign producers, as both constrain employer’s ability to discriminate against 
specific groups of workers. I use domestic market concentration ratios and price cost margins 
to capture the former, as well as import and export measures that capture the effects of 
foreign competition.  
Various specifications are used to test the robustness of the results to functional form and 
different competition measure specifications. The estimation results support Becker’s 
implication of a negative relationship between the level of competition in the product market 
and employer taste discrimination across all specifications. The preferred estimate, which 
limits the estimated coefficients to within-industry effects, suggests that a change from fully 
monopolistic to fully competitive market (from a concentration ratio of one to zero) decreases 
the log gender wage gap by 0.06. Based on the 0.2 drop in the average concentration ratio 
between 1986 and 2003, the effect of the higher level of competition faced by firms can 
account for roughly 7 percent of the 0.18 drop in the average within-firm log wage gap. 
Increased competition through trade also has a significant negative effect on discrimination: 
the estimated coefficient of import penetration is -0.08, while that of industry export share is 
-0.12. This means that the effect of increased competition from exports can account for 7 
percent of the drop in the overall wage gap on average, while increased competition from 
imports accounts for 1 percent. The negative significant relationship remains robust in 
various specifications, including when domestic market competition is measured using the 
price cost margin instead of the concentration ratio.  
 The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows: section II reviews previous 
studies on competition and the gender wage gap. Section III describes Becker’s model of 
employer discrimination, its implications, and the general specification used in the empirical 
tests. Section IV describes data and sample characteristics, the evolution of the overall and 
the unexplained gender wage gap in Hungary 1986-2003, and the construction of the 
measures of competition. Section V presents and discusses the results of the estimation. 
Section VI concludes. 
                                                 
8 Using an estimate of the within-firm wage gap corresponds to the assumptions of Becker’s model, where the 
decision to discriminate is made at the firm level, by the employer. 
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 II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
 
Several recent studies estimate the relationship between industry level gender wage gaps and 
competition measures.9 Black and Brainerd (2004) estimate the impact of increased levels of 
imports on the industry-level residual wage gap in concentrated versus non-concentrated 
sectors using CPS data for 1977-1994. They find that increased competition through trade 
contributed to the narrowing of the US gender pay gap during that time period. On the other 
hand, Reilly and Dutta (2005) examine the relationship between industry-specific gender pay 
gaps and different measures of trade in India, but find little evidence that trade measures are 
determinants of the gap. Black and Strahan (2001) focus on the effect of government 
deregulation in the banking industry. They find that prior to deregulation, rents were shared 
disproportionately with male workers compared to females, and that increased competition 
following the deregulation led to a rise in the relative wages of women. The availability of 
matched employer employee data allows for some improvements over industry level analysis. 
I am able to account for the role of firm and worker characteristics, and selection of workers 
in explaining the overall wage gap, and use a much higher number of observations for testing 
the effects of competition than analysis done at the industry level. 
Meng and Meurs (2004) propose a methodology that can be used to study the firm’s role 
in determining the gender wage gap by estimating a firm-specific gender wage premium for 
each firm in a single year. The premium is drawn from the firm fixed effects coefficients of 
wage regressions on separate male and female samples. They estimate the effect of 
competition on this gap using basic dummy variables10 to proxy for degree of market 
competition faced by the firm, based on data from French and Australian surveys from 1992 
and 1995. Though this is not the main goal of the paper, the authors find evidence that 
competitive market forces reduce discrimination in Australia, but no significant effect in the 
case of France. As this test is performed for a single year of data, they cannot control for 
unobservable characteristics that may differ in competitive industries relative to non-
competitive industries and lead to a bias in the estimated effect of competition on 
discrimination, while this paper does so using data from several years. The rapid and 
extensive changes in competition during the time period covered by the data capture changes 
in wage setting policies of employers in response to shocks to the competitive environment 
they faced. Since the Hungarian WES data follows firms over time, I am able to capture not 
                                                 
9 Rather than testing the relationship between the wage gap and competition measures, some previous studies 
used alternative approaches to test Becker’s implication: Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) find a significant 
negative relationship between banks’ market power and their share of female employment. Hellerstein, Neumark 
and Troske (2002) test the relationship between profitability and ratio of females employed, and finds evidence 
that firms with higher female employment are more profitable, supporting Becker’s theory.  
10 As this is not the focus of their paper, the authors use only very rudimentary measures of competition based on 
surveyed manager’s responses to some basic questions regarding the market they are in. 
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 only variation in competition levels among different industries, but also variation within 
industries over time. 
 
III. MODEL AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
BECKER’S MODEL OF EMPLOYER TASTE DISCRIMINATION 
 
Becker’s 1957 model of employer taste discrimination has been widely cited as the basis for 
the analysis of the gender wage gap and the part of it that is due to discrimination by 
employers. In his model, some employers have a personal preference for employing males 
rather than females. Hiring a female worker rather than an equally qualified male worker 
gives them some positive disutility, depending on their personal preferences. Alternatively, 
employers prefer a lower ratio of female to male workers, and the amount of disutility they 
suffer from hiring female workers is dependent upon the ratio female workers in their firm.  
Employers can be thought of as maximizing their individual utility function, which 
reflects the “cost” of hiring a certain ratio11 of females: 
U(π,F/M) = π – d(F/M) = f(M+F) – wmM – wfF – d(F/M) 
where f(M+F) is the production function of the firm, F and M are the number of female and 
male workers at the firm, wm and wf are the wages of males and females, and d is a constant 
reflecting the employer’s disutility from employing a higher ratio of female workers. The 
value of d is constrained by variables that affect the employer’s ability to discriminate. The 
constant d varies among employers (by firm,) its value is greater than zero for discriminating 
employers, and equals zero if the employer is non-discriminatory. 
 Solving for the first order conditions of the employer’s utility maximization problem 
gives us: 
MPL = wf + d/M 
MPL = wm – d(F/M2) 
where MPL is the marginal product of labor. 
 The first order conditions suggest that in equilibrium, the wage paid to male workers 
is higher than that paid to female workers: wm > wf. Employers can adjust the cost of hiring 
women by adjusting the ratio of females in the firm. Those who are less discriminatory, or 
                                                 
11 In this paper, I assume that it is the ratio of females in the firm that matters to the employer, not the absolute 
number. This maintains consistency with empirical evidence that firms hire a mix of both male and female 
employees, while a model where the number of female employees matters to the employer would suggest 
otherwise. 
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 have a lower d, hire relatively more women. Employers who indulge their discriminatory 
tastes will hire a lower than profit-maximizing ratio of female workers, and share part of their 
rents with male workers in the form of higher wages. The difference between the wage of a 
female worker and a male worker is composed of the difference in productivity between the 
two, and a firm-specific gender wage gap that reflects the part of the rents he receives beyond 
his productivity: 
wm - wf = (MPLm – MPLf) + [dj/Mj + dj(Fj/Mj2)] = (MPLm – MPLf) + gender gapj
For a male worker and a female worker at firm j with equivalent characteristics this becomes: 
wm – wf = gender gapj
 The firm gender wage gap varies by employer, and is constrained by the availability of 
rents to be paid to male employees. An employer whose firm operates in a relatively more 
competitive market, and thus captures lower rents, will pay a lower gender premium to men 
relative to women than if the firm faced a less competitive setting, where more rents are 
available to indulge discriminatory tastes. In the long run, if there is an increase in the 
amount of competition in a product market, employers who pay a gender premium will be 
forced out of the market, as they will be unable to compete with non-discriminating firms due 
to the higher cost. Thus the model implies a negative relationship between product market 
competition and the firm level gender wage gap. 
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
 The empirical strategy for testing this relationship is composed of two stages, using a 
weighting scheme based on Wooldridge (2003)12. The first stage in the process is the 
estimation of the dependent variable in Becker’s implication, the within-firm adjusted gender 
wage gap for each firm in each year. This reflects the part of the within-firm gender wage gap 
that is not explained by differences in the productive characteristics of male and female 
workers, and thus represents discrimination by the employer. The gap varies among firms 
within each industry according to each employer’s preferences, but is constant for each 
worker within firms. The variable used to measure the gap needs to capture the firm level 
variation in the gender wage gap that remains after we account for the differences in 
observable productive characteristics of male and female workers.  
 The within-firm gap is estimated by running an OLS regression of the following wage 
equation within each firm for each year of the worker level dataset: 
                                                 
12 See also Chapter 10 in Wooldridge (2002). 
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 lnwi = α + βXi + γMi + ui , 
where lnwi is the log real wage of worker i, Xi includes the observable characteristics of 
worker i (education, experience, and experience squared),13 Mi is a gender dummy equal to 
one if the worker is male, and ui is the error term. The coefficient estimate of the male 
dummy, the estimated within-firm gender gap, is retrieved for each firm, giving the 
dependent variable in the second stage: 
γjt = gapjt = adjusted gender wage gap at firm j in year t. 
The gap can only be estimated for firms with at least two male and two female workers in 
the sample, though this was further limited to firms with at least ten of each in the preferred 
specifications. There is a variation in the noisiness of the gap estimates among firms based on 
the number of workers observed. The gap estimate becomes more precise for large firms with 
a high number of observations. To account for this variation, the standard error of the 
estimate is also retrieved so that the inverse of the squared standard errors can be used to 
weight each firm year observation in the second stage regression. This weighting scheme 
allows more weight to be given in the second stage test to observations where the estimation 
of the within-firm gap is more precise compared to observations whose estimated gaps may 
be noisier due to low number of observed workers. 
The second stage regressions, estimated on the firm level dataset pooled for all years, will 
be of the general form: 
gapjt = α + β1*CMkt + β2*Xjt + ejt , 
where gapjt  stands for the estimated wage gap for firm j at time t, CMkt stands for various 
functions of the measures of competition for industry k at time t, Xjt includes additional 
controls, and ejt is the error term. If increased competition does lead to a fall in employer 
discrimination, as suggested in Becker’s model, we expect the estimated coefficient of CMkt to 
have a negative sign.  
In order to assess the robustness of the results, the implication is tested under numerous 
specifications. Competition is measured using several different linear and non-linear 
functions of domestic market competition measures, such as the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index and the price cost margin, and the trade variables: import penetration and export 
share. The controls in Xjt always include dummy variables for each year in order to capture 
economy-wide trends, while the second set of regression specifications include industry fixed 
effects as well. In these cases, the estimated coefficients of CMkt represent within industry 
effects, and thus capture the effect of variation in competitiveness on employer 
                                                 
13 Though the specification with only these worker variables is preferred due to the inherent endogeneity issues 
of including occupation variables in wage equations, the within-firm and within-occupation gap was also 
estimated with occupation dummies included in the controls. The results of the second stage test were 
qualitatively similar to those included in the paper, and are available upon request. 
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 discrimination within an industry over time. The industry fixed effects estimate alleviates 
bias due to any unobserved industry characteristics, and is thus the preferred specification. 
The equations are estimated for both the full sample and a sample limited to manufacturing 
industries, as the measurement of trade and competition is often more accurate in the case of 
goods than services. Finally, an alternative implication of Becker’s theory is tested as a 
further robustness check, which suggests that if employers were hiring a lower than profit 
maximizing number of female workers, increased competitive pressures should have raised 
the ratio of female workers within firms. 
IV. DATA AND MEASURES OF COMPETITION 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The Hungarian Wage and Earnings Survey (WES) is collected by the National Employment 
Office since 1986, with subsequent surveys in 1989, 1992, and annually since until 2003. This 
means that the data covers the period before the transition, as well as during and after the 
changes, allowing for the study of the full effect of liberalization on the gender wage gap. The 
survey includes a dataset of workers with basic worker characteristics, characteristics of the 
firm of their employment, and a code that identifies the firm they work for. This code can be 
used to link each worker to a second dataset of firms, which contains more detailed firm 
characteristics. Workers cannot be followed over time in the data, but specific firms have 
identical codes in each year, so the matched employer-employee dataset is a panel in terms of 
firms, but not workers.  
 The sample frame for the WES included all full time workers from tax-paying legal 
entities with double-sided balance sheets that employed at least 20 employees in 1986, 
extended to firms with at least 10 workers in 1995, and from 1999 on to micro-firms as well.  
In 1986 and 1989, workers were selected into the sample using a random design based on 
fixed intervals of selection, with every seventh production worker and every fifth non-
production worker selected in 1986, and every tenth worker regardless of type selected in 
1989. Starting from 1992, workers were selected into the sample based on their date of birth: 
production workers were included if their birth date fell on either the 5th or the 15th of any 
month, and non-production workers if it fell on the 5th, 10th, or 15th of a month.  
 The sample selected for this paper is limited to private sector firms with at least 20 
employees in order to maintain consistency over all years of data. The sample was further 
limited to firms that have at least two male and two female workers in the survey to allow for 
the calculation of gender differences within each firm.14 The resulting dataset contains 
                                                 
14 The sample is restricted to firms with at least ten men and ten women in the preferred specification, to reduce 
random noisiness of the estimated within-firm gender wage gap. 
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 observations on roughly 1.2 million workers from 15 thousand firms, representative of the 
Hungarian labor force in terms of industry, region and size when weights are used to correct 
for the sampling differences between production and non-production workers, as well as for 
under-sampling of small firms and firm non-response.15 Worker characteristics in the 
matched dataset - used to estimate the firm level residual wage gap - include monthly gross 
real wage, gender, education (four categories: elementary, vocational, high school, 
university), age and potential experience, and occupation. Firm characteristics of the WES 
include firm employment, industry, region, revenue, export sales, and ownership. Table 1 
provides some basic summary statistics of the WES data sample. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Wage and Earnings Survey Sample, 1986-
2003 
 
Year Number of workers 
Average real 
wage 
Percent 
female in 
dataset 
Number 
of firms
Number of 
firms in 
manufacturing 
Average 
number of 
employees
1986 98,274 100,156 41.0% 2,839 851 10,227 
1989 113,762 114,153 41.0% 3,626 1,072 9,776 
1992 83,084 108,522 43.1% 2,887 841 10,809 
1993 81,813 112,466 44.3% 2,857 881 9,722 
1994 86,750 118,124 43.5% 3,411 1,166 8,136 
1995 87,132 105,421 43.2% 3,299 1,199 7,551 
1996 82,397 108,155 42.9% 3,199 1,215 7,120 
1997 71,868 111,222 43.2% 2,991 1,154 6,354 
1998 80,692 114,917 42.2% 3,153 1,247 5,842 
1999 80,968 122,641 42.0% 3,297 1,283 5,690 
2000 88,842 124,776 43.3% 3,680 1,396 5,368 
2001 86,854 130,061 43.3% 3,629 1,400 5,281 
2002 93,685 138,778 41.4% 3,525 1,354 4,641 
2003 95,936 140,601 42.4% 3,523 1,357 4,492 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WES dataset. 
                                                 
15 Worker weights are constructed using information on the number of production and non-production workers 
employed in each sampled firm. Firm weights are based on industry and size data from the National Tax 
Authority, which contains firm-level information on every double-entry bookkeeping firm in Hungary. 
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 The Wage and Earnings Survey data was previously used by Campos and Jolliffe 
(2004) to study the changes in the gender wage gap up to 1998. They found that in Hungary, 
the overall (unconditional) log gender wage gap declined from 0.31 to 0.19 between 1986 and 
1998. Roughly 0.11 of the total change was due to a decline in the portion of the wage gap that 
is unexplained by observable characteristics, even after controlling for labor market selection. 
Figure 1 shows the total log wage gap and estimated unexplained wage gap in Hungary, 
estimated using the same methodology on the Wage and Earnings Survey sample used in this 
paper, with additional years up to 2003. 
 
Figure 1.: The evolution of the overall and the endowment-adjusted gender wage 
gap in Hungary 1986-2003 
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Data from the Wage and Earnings Survey 1986-2003. Workers included from firms in the private sector which have at least 
twenty employees. The unexplained log gender wage gap is estimated using a standard Mincerian wage equation with 
controls for worker education, potential experience, industry, and region of employment. Specification does not include firm 
fixed effects. 
 
The overall gender wage gap for private sector workers fell from a high of .34 in 1989 to 
.20 by 1992, and continued to fall at a slower rate to .15 by 2003. Relative changes in 
observable characteristics do not explain much of the fall in the wage gap, the unexplained 
gap falls from .29 in 1989 to .15 in 2003. Although Campos and Jolliffe interpret this residual 
wage gap as the “discrimination component,” and it is clear that this component explains 
most of the decline in the overall wage gap, we cannot tell whether any fall in discrimination 
was due to the changes in the competitive environment during and after the transition, since 
this specification of the model does not include variables measuring the level of competition. 
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MEASURES OF COMPETITION  
 
One key aspect in testing Becker’s implication is the correct measurement of product market 
competition facing each firm. I use various measures and specifications in order to address 
the major issues with measuring competition as outlined by previous literature, and to serve 
as robustness checks for the estimation results. One main issue discussed frequently is the 
importance of defining accurately the relevant product market of each firm. Bikker and Haaf 
(2002) define the relevant market as being inclusive of all suppliers of a good who are actual 
or potential competitors, so its definition has a product dimension as well as a geographical 
dimension. Ideally, these markets could be defined based on actual product data of the firms. 
However, this is not available for the firms in the WES, so analysis must be based on their 
industrial classification codes. The markets are defined at the three-digit SIC level, as the 
two-digit level proved too broad, while the four-digit level is too disaggregated, and does not 
contain enough observations for analysis in some industries.16  
The regional aspect of the market definition is addressed by the inclusion of trade 
variables. The import variable captures competition from foreign producers selling in the 
domestic market. These obviously force employers to increase efficiency, for example, by 
decreasing discriminatory behavior, in order to be able to compete. The export variable 
pertains to the involvement of domestic producers in the global markets. A higher export 
share in an industry reflects a more competitive setting, as firms that export are, in general, 
also forced to be more efficient. 
The most common domestic market competition measures used in Industrial 
Organization literature are concentration ratios and the price cost margins.17 I calculate the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) for each three-digit industry in each year based on the 
firm revenue information given in the WES survey. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a value 
of zero representing perfect competition, and a value of one representing a fully monopolistic 
market. Alternatively, the four-firm concentration ratio was also calculated based on the 
market share of the largest four firms in each industry. The results were not significantly 
different using this measure, and preference is given to the Hirschman-Herfindahl index due 
to the fact that it takes all firms producing in an industry into account. To assess the amount 
of variation in the concentration ratio within industries over time, Figure 2.a plots the 
                                                 
16 The test of Becker’s implication was also performed using the two-digit level competition measures. These 
also showed a smaller, though still significant negative relationship between competition and the within-firm 
gender wage gap. 
17 See Boone, van Ours, and van der Wiel (2007) for an assessment of the performance of these competition 
measures. 
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 concentration ratio for each three-digit industry in 1986 versus the concentration ratio in 
1998. 
 
Figure 2.a.: Changes in the Hirschman-Herfindahl Concentration Index in 
Hungary between 1989 and 1998
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Source: Wage and Employment Survey 
 
 
The 45 degree line in the graph theoretically represents points where the concentration 
ratio remained unchanged between 1989 and 1998. Some industries seem to fall near this 
line, especially those with concentration levels near zero, which were highly competitive to 
begin with. The points representing the majority of the industries fall below the 45 degree 
line, which means that in these markets, the concentration ratio fell between 1989 and 1998, 
competition increased. Market concentration increased in a few industries, mostly some 
specialized manufacturing industries, such as office equipment or forest machinery. Overall, 
the graph suggests there has been a lot of change in the competition levels faced by firms 
during the time period covered by the data.  
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  The trade variables used to capture competition from foreign firms also display high 
levels of variation across years and among industries. The import penetration ratios18 are 
calculated, at the three-digit SIC level, using nominal import data provided by the Institute of 
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Figure 2.b shows the import penetration 
levels of the industries in 1989 plotted against the levels in 1998. 
 
Figure 2.b.: Changes in Import Penetration Ratio by Three-digit Industry in 
Hungary between 1989 and 1998 
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 Again, the 45 degree line represents no change in import penetration. Few industries 
appear to be unchanged during the time period, with some points clustered at import levels 
of zero. The majority of the points in the graph lie above the line, suggesting that import 
penetration levels increased in most industries. Many points lie near the vertical line 
representing zero imports in 1989, representing industries where new trade relations were 
made following the transition. Some markets appear to have decreased import dependence, 
mostly those with strong ties to former Soviet Block markets.  
                                                 
18 Import penetration ratio is calculated as imports divided by the sum of industry sales revenue and imports less 
export sales. 
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 Three digit industry level export shares19 are calculated using firm export revenue and 
sales revenue data from the Wage and Employment Survey. Figure 2.c shows the changes in 
export share during the time period.   
 
Figure 2.c.: Changes in Export Share by Three-Digit Industry in Hungary between 
1986 and 1998
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Again, the majority of the points lie above the 45 degree line, suggesting that export 
shares increased between 1989 and 1998 in most industries. Industries which formerly 
catered to communist allies lost some of their export markets, and show a fall in export 
shares. The graphs representing export and import variables both show rapid and extensive 
change in competition during the time period covered by the WES data. This supports the 
idea that the data can be used very effectively in testing Becker’s implication regarding the 
effect these changes have on employer discrimination.   
 
 
                                                 
19 Export share is calculated as total 3 digit industry export sales divided by industry sales revenue. 
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 V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
A quick look at the evolution of the mean firm level gender wage gap and the mean domestic 
market concentration from 1986 to 2003, seen in Figure 3, seems to reinforce the validity of 
the implication. On average, the premium paid to male workers dropped from .28 in 1986 to 
.14 in 2002. During the same period, the mean concentration fell from .34 to .16. The average 
firm gender wage gap and market concentration seem show a clear positive relationship, 
supporting the notion that increased competition led to lower discrimination. This figure, 
however, can obviously only be interpreted as circumstantial evidence of a negative 
correlation between competition and discrimination. It is the estimated effect of variation in 
competitive levels among industries and across time on the wage gap at firms that shows 
whether the fall in the wage gap was caused by the increased competition in markets. 
 
Figure 3: The Evolution of the Mean Within-firm Log Gender Wage Gap and 
Mean Industry Concentration, 1986-2003
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firm log gender wage gap adjusted for basic worker characteristics (education, potential experience). The 
Concentration Ratio is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index calculated at the three-digit industry level. 
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 To test whether this is the case, I use the within-firm gender wage gap, estimated in the 
first stage regression as outlined in section III, and the various competition measures to run 
the second stage regressions of the form: 
gapjt = α + β1*CMkt + β2*Xjt + ejt , 
where gapjt  stands for the estimated gender wage gap for firm j at time t, CMkt the measures 
of competition for industry k at time t, Xjt includes additional controls, and ejt is the error 
term. If increased competition does lead to a fall in employer discrimination, as suggested in 
Becker’s model, we expect the estimated coefficient of CMkt to have a negative sign. In the 
regression specifications, the concentration ratio is subtracted from one and referred to as 
domestic competition. This variable still ranges from 0 to 1, but increased competition is 
represented by an increase in the variable, and its expected sign in the test is negative as it is 
in the case of the other measures. 
Table 2 presents the results of the second stage regressions run on the WES sample of 
firms for whom we observe at least ten men and ten women each in the employee dataset. 
The second stage regressions are all weighted by the inverse square of the standard error of 
the firm gap estimated in the first stage, as described in section III. In the base specifications, 
the sample of firms is treated as a cross-section sample, with dummy variables included for 
each year to capture economy-wide trends. Robust standard errors of the estimates are 
shown in parentheses. The sample used in the first three specifications includes all 
industries, while specifications 4 and 5 are limited to the manufacturing sector only. 
Table 2.: Second Stage Regression Results 
 
 All industries Manufacturing 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1-HHI -.051** (.019) 
-.062** 
(.021) 
-.058** 
(.021) 
-.108** 
(.040) 
-.093** 
(.031) 
Import 
penetration . 
.029 
(.026) 
-.082** 
(.019) 
-.018 
(.020) 
-.035 
(.022) 
Export share . -.059* (.022) 
-.121** 
(.038) 
-.038 
(.031) 
-.163** 
(.039) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE N N Y N Y 
Weighted Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of 
observations 7752 7752 7752 3696 3696 
R squared .422 .492 .654 .426 .569 
Data from the Wage and Earnings Survey for Hungary 1986-2003. Sample includes private sector firms with at 
least 20 employees, and at least ten men and ten women included in the survey. Dependent variable is firm level 
residual wage gap δj. 1-HHI is the domestic competition measure, the difference of one and the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index. Dummies for each year are included in all specifications. ** denote significance at the 1% 
level, * at the 5% level. Industry-year robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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  The results indicate a significant negative relationship between domestic market 
competition and the firm gender wage gap across all specifications, supporting Becker’s 
implication. The second column labeled as specification 1 includes only the domestic market 
competition as an explanatory variable, without the trade variables. The coefficient estimate 
of -.051 suggests that complete lack of competitive pressures in a product market may lead to 
a log wage gap that is as much as .051 higher than it would be in a perfectly competitive 
setting. The second specification adds the two trade variables as explanatory variables. The 
estimated effect of domestic competition increases to -.062, and is significant at the 1% level. 
In other words, the estimate suggests that the gender wage gap would be 6.2 percentage 
points lower in a competitive market than an otherwise identical monopolistic one. Import 
penetration has a positive insignificant estimated coefficient in this specification. Export 
share, on the other hand, has a significant coefficient of -.059. This means an industry where 
firms produce only in order to export to the global market has a gender wage gap that is .059 
lower than in an industry where firms produce only for the domestic market. 
 Specification 3 also includes industry fixed effects at the three-digit SIC level, the level 
of aggregation of the competition measures. This serves the same purpose as would the use of 
differenced data, in that it eliminates bias due to unobservable industry characteristics. The 
estimated coefficient of the competition measures should be interpreted as a within industry 
effect in this case, which capture the effect of variation over time in competition levels. This is 
the most stringent test of Becker’s implication, in that the estimated effect of competition is 
independent of specific industry characteristics. The results indicate a significant negative 
relationship between competition and the firm gender wage gap for all three competition 
measures, supporting the theoretical implication. The coefficient of domestic market 
competition (1-concentration index) is -.058, significant at the 1% level. This means if 
domestic competition increased from 0 to 1 (the concentration ratio fell from 1 to 0) in an 
industry, the log gender wage gap would fall by .058. The economy-wide average domestic 
competition level rose by .2 between 1986 and 2003, while the average log gender wage gap 
fell by .18. This means that the increase in competition may account for roughly 7 percent of 
the fall in the gender wage gap. The estimated coefficient of import penetration is -.082, and 
that of export share is   -.121, both significant at the 1% level, further supporting the 
implication. Based on the average changes in import penetration and export share over the 
time period, the effect of increased competition from imports may explain 1 percent of the fall 
in the gender wage gap, while increased competition from higher export levels may explain 7 
percent of the decline. 
Specifications 4 and 5 limit the sample of firms to only those in the manufacturing 
industry, to address the issue that product market competition and trade may be more 
accurately measured in this sector. Specification 5 includes industry fixed effects, while 
specification 4 does not. The estimated coefficient of the domestic competition remains 
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 negative and significant over both specifications, ranging from -.093 to -.108. The coefficients 
of import penetration and export share are negative but insignificant in specification 4. The 
coefficient estimate of export share becomes significant when industry fixed effects are 
added. The estimated effect of export share is especially high in the manufacturing sector in 
the final specification, suggesting an industry which produces fully for the world market has a 
.16 lower log wage gap than one that produces for the domestic market alone. 
 
PRICE COST MARGIN AS DOMESTIC COMPETITION MEASURE 
 
 
The alternative measure to the concentration ratio frequently used in Industrial Organization 
literature is the price cost margin. This can be calculated easily from the WES data as market 
aggregate profits divided by market aggregate revenues, and provides an opportunity for a 
robustness check. Table 3 shows the results of the second stage test with the price cost 
margin as the domestic competition measure instead of the concentration ratio. 
  
Table 3.: Price Cost Margin Results 
 All industries Manufacturing 
Competition -.137** (.051) 
-.104** 
(.035) 
-.305** 
(.075) 
-.074** 
(.031) 
Import 
penetration 
.014 
(.034) 
.055 
(.036) 
-.095 
(.091) 
-.020 
(.063) 
Export share -.018 (.032) 
-.042 
(.045) 
-.059* 
(.026) 
-.056 
(.046) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE N Y N Y 
Weighted Y Y Y Y 
Number of obs. 4608 4608 3303 3303 
R squared .453 .639 .495 .621 
Data from the Wage and Earnings Survey for Hungary 1986-2003. Dependent variable is firm level residual 
wage gap δj. Sample includes private sector firms with at least 20 employees, and at least ten men and ten 
women included in the survey. Dummies for each year are included in all specifications. ** denote significance 
at the 1% level, * at the 5% level. White sandwich estimators are used to calculate industry-year robust standard 
errors, shown in parentheses. 
 
The first two specifications include the full sample of industries, while the last two are 
restricted to the manufacturing sector. The first and third columns do not contain industry 
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 fixed effects, while the second and fourth do. The results support the implication that 
increased competition lowers employers’ ability to discriminate. Domestic market 
competition, measured as the price cost margin, has a significant negative relationship with 
the firm level gender wage gap. Evaluating the size of the estimated coefficients is more 
difficult here than in the case of the concentration ratio, as the price cost margin has a bigger 
range and no simple interpretation. The trade variables have a negative sign as well, but they 
lose their significance in these specifications in most cases. 
NON-LINEAR FUNCTIONS OF COMPETITION MEASURES 
 
The base specifications of the second stage regression presented so far all assumed that the 
gender wage gap is a linear function of the different competition measures. The regressions 
in Table 4 relax this assumption, and examine the relationship between discrimination and 
some nonlinear functions of the domestic market competition measures (Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index and Price Cost Margin), the import penetration ratio, and export share. The 
first two specifications in Table 4 interact functions of the two domestic competition 
measures and import penetration. The other specifications interact the export share variable 
as well. The final two columns include industry fixed effects, while the first four do not. The 
interacted variables all increase as competition increases (since I include the functions 1-HHI 
and –PCM in the case of the domestic measures), so they should all affect the gender wage 
gap in the same direction. The interaction terms are expected to have a negative estimated 
coefficient in all specifications based on Becker’s implication. 
 
Table 4.: Results with Functions of Competition Measures
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Function (1-HHI) *imp 
-PCM 
*imp 
(1-HHI) 
*imp*exp 
-PCM 
*imp*exp 
(1-HHI) 
*imp*exp 
-PCM 
*imp*exp
Competition -.089** (.025) 
-.143** 
(.054) 
-.087* 
(.038) 
-.149** 
(.058) 
-.085* 
(.032) 
-.108** 
(.036) 
Year 
dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE N N N N Y Y 
Weighted Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of 
obs. 4608 4608 4608 4608 4608 4608 
R squared .459 .453 .456 .454 .628 .639 
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 Data from the Wage and Earnings Survey for Hungary 1986-2003. Dependent variable is firm level residual 
wage gap δj. Sample includes private sector firms with at least 20 employees, and at least ten men and ten 
women included in the survey. The explanatory variable is an interaction of 1-Hirschmann Herfindahl index (1-
HHI), import penetration ratio (imp), the negative of the price cost margin (-PCM), and the export share (exp). 
Dummies for each year are included in all specifications. ** denote significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% 
level. White sandwich estimators are used to calculate industry-year robust standard errors, shown in 
parentheses.  
 
The results consistently indicate a significant negative relationship between competition 
and the wage gap. When domestic competition is measured by one minus the concentration 
ratio, the estimated coefficient of the combined competition measure is roughly -.09 in all 
three cases. Thus a unit change in the interaction term would result in a 9 percent fall in the 
gender wage gap. In the price cost margin specifications, the coefficient ranges from about -
.11 to -.15, and is significant at the 1 percent level in all cases. 
RATIO OF FEMALES EMPLOYED 
 
An alternative implication of Becker’s theory provides us with an opportunity for a final 
robustness check of the results. Discriminating employers not only pay a wage premium to 
men, but also hire a less than profit maximizing ratio of female workers. Higher levels of 
competition (a lower concentration ratio) should thus lead to a higher ratio of female workers 
in firms as competition drives employers to act more efficiently. Table 5 presents the results 
on the effect of competition on the firm level female ratio for some simple specifications. 
 
Table 5.: Results with Ratio of Females as the Dependent Variable 
 
 1 2 3 
Competition .377** (.106) 
.581** 
(.153) 
.056* 
(.021) 
Import 
penetration . 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.001) 
Export 
share . 
.569** 
(.143) 
.408* 
(.161) 
Year 
dummies Y Y Y 
Industry FE N N Y 
Number of 
obs. 7752 7752 7752 
R squared .207 .231 .548 
 
Data from the Wage and Earnings Survey for Hungary 1986-2003. Dependent variable: ratio of females at firm j. 
Sample includes private sector firms with at least 20 employees, and at least ten men and ten women included in 
the survey. Dummies for each year are included in all specifications. ** denote significance at the 1% level, * at 
the 5% level. White sandwich estimators are used to calculate industry-year robust standard errors, shown in 
parentheses.  
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The results support the previous results from the firm premium regressions. A higher 
level of domestic market competition is correlated with a higher ratio of female employees in 
firms, and higher levels of exports are correlated with higher female ratios as well. The 
estimated coefficient of import penetration is near zero and insignificant. Overall, these 
results again suggest that gender discrimination by employers exists, and competition puts 
pressure on discriminating employers. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper tests the implications of Becker’s (1957) employer taste discrimination model 
using data from Hungary 1986-2003, a period in which the country’s market, and thus the 
environment faced by firms, underwent extensive liberalization. Results indicating that 
increased competition led to a fall in the gender wage gap due to lower discrimination give a 
positive explanation for some of the observed fall in the overall wage gap. A dataset of about 
1.2 million workers – roughly 90 thousand for each year covered by the survey – is used to 
estimate the within-firm residual gender wage gap after controlling for differences in 
observable characteristics of workers. The variation in this measure among firms, and over 
time within the same firm, is used to test both the implications of the model: that higher 
levels of competition mean lower levels of discrimination by employers all else equal, and 
increases over time in competition lead to decreases in gender wage discrimination and thus 
a fall in the overall gender wage gap. Competition is measured both by domestic market 
concentration, the price cost margin, and measures of trade to capture the full range of 
competitive pressures faced by firms in the post-transitional era. 
 The results support the hypothesis that competition constrains employers’ ability to 
discriminate by lowering the rents available in an industry. Domestic market competition has 
a significant negative relationship with the level of the firm level gender wage gap, and a 
decrease in the concentration ratio – or increase in the level of competition – leads to a fall in 
the firm gender gap. The estimated impact of increased domestic competition can account for 
roughly 7 percent, while increased competition from trade can explain 8 percent of the fall in 
the economy-wide average log gender wage gap. However, in certain industries that changed 
from fully or nearly monopolistic markets to almost fully competitive, the change in domestic 
competition alone may account for roughly a third of the fall in the firm level gender wage 
gap. The results presented in this paper provide new evidence supporting the implication of 
Becker’s discrimination model that increased competition lowers employers’ ability to 
discriminate by demanding more efficient behavior in their hiring and wage setting practices.
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 APPENDIX 
OVERVIEW OF MARKET REFORMS IN HUNGARY 1988-1998 
The end of the 1980s was characterized by deep economic and political crises in most Central 
Eastern European countries, stemming from the general collapse of the centrally planned 
economic systems. In Hungary, high levels of centralization and concentration led to 
increasingly high levels of expenditure by the government - the revenues redistributed by the 
state budget were close to seventy percent of the GDP20 - while economic performance was 
low, the GDP falling steeply. The state budget deficit continued to expand, hurting 
opportunities for development, while also hindering firms’ production through high tax rates. 
Similar situations of crisis led to social and economic reforms in all of the countries of the 
former Eastern Bloc, though they differed widely in speed of implementation, depth of 
change, and success. 
Hungary was more fortunate than many of its neighbors in the respect that even 
preceding the transition, it enjoyed a relatively more liberal and advanced economy. In 1968, 
the Stalinist goal of self-sufficiency was replaced by the "New Economic Mechanism," which 
reopened Hungary to foreign trade, gave limited freedom to the workings of the market, and 
allowed a limited number of small businesses to operate in the services sector. By 1988, 
Hungary had also developed a two-tier banking system and some basic corporate legislation, 
paving the way for the drastic reforms market reforms that soon followed. 
Despite the continuous loosening of the centrally planned economy, Hungary was  
experiencing a severe lack of investment in both agriculture and industry from the 1970s, and 
a sharp rise in its net foreign debt, from $1 billion in 1973 to $15 billion in 1993, mostly due 
to consumer subsidies and unprofitable state enterprises. The shape of company structure 
according to size was like that of an upside-down pyramid, with very few small companies, 
some medium sized ones, and a huge set of large companies. Within companies, 
organizational level and management skills were out of date, and productivity was extremely 
low. 
The process of moving the economy away from the centrally planned system to a market-
driven one was a difficult one, with both expected and unforeseen problems along the way. In 
addition to measures of liberalization that needed to be undertaken, namely those of 
eliminating price controls and relaxing trade protection, transitional economies also faced 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Katalin Némethné Pàl “Small Open Economies: The Benefits of Foreign Investment”, Presentation at the 1st 
International Conference of Association of South Eastern European Economic Universities. Thessaloniki, May 24-27, 2000. 
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 further tasks: abolishing state orders and procurement, production, and monopolies, as well 
as the centralized allocation of foreign exchange. Liberalization, in this case, involved freeing 
prices, trade, as well as entry from state controls. 
The government of József Antall initiated major reforms between 1990-1994 with rapid 
price and trade liberalization, a revamped tax system, and a nascent market-based banking 
system. However, reduced exports to the former Soviet bloc and shrinking industrial output 
contributed to a sharp decline in GDP, while government overspending continued to hinder 
the economy: the budget and current account deficits approached 10% of GDP. In 1995 the 
government of Gyula Horn implemented an austerity program, along with aggressive 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and an export-promoting program, in order to 
reduce indebtedness and cut the current account deficit. 
These initial regulations were made without the benefit of prior experience and somewhat 
hastily, and produced many subsequent problems. Every new government had its own ideas 
about the best strategy for privatization, but due to the lack of domestic capital, encouraging 
foreign investment was an important element throughout the transitional years, as it is today. 
The rapid liberalization measures seemed to have paid off, the entrepreneurial sector began 
to flourish as a result: the number of registered economic organizations increased from 391 
thousand to 1.1 million. The move from state-owned enterprises to private sector production 
was rapid: by 1998, eighty percent of the GDP was produced by the private sector. Foreign 
direct investment streamed into the country, totaling roughly sixty billion dollars since 1989. 
Roughly two-thirds of manufacturing was foreign-owned, as well as seventy percent of 
financial institutions, and ninety percent of the telecom sector. 
 
Table: Composition of subscribed capital of companies according to owners, 
1992-1998 
 
 1992 1996 1998 
State 58,9 22,5 13,3 
Local government 5,1 7,5 7,6 
Private person, 
domestic 
9,8 12,6 11,2 
Company, domestic 12,4 20,5 26,2 
Foreigners 10,1 31,5 37,6 
Others 3,7 5,4 4,1 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: GKI – Economic Research Institute of Hungary 
 
The transition to a market-based economy was not without its costs: it was accompanied 
by severe socio-economic problems and tensions. All the countries in the region faced the loss 
of their former export markets when the former Soviet bloc became inoperative, which was 
accompanied by a drop in domestic demand, as well as a simultaneous recession in the 
Western European export markets. Hungary's GDP declined about 18% from 1990 to 1993 
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 and grew only 1%–1.5% annually up until 1996. Unemployment rose rapidly, to a maximum 
of about 12% in 1993, and inflation rates were above twenty percent a year until 1997. 
After a few years, in which major restructuring of the industry took place, exports began 
to rise, aided by the settlement of multinational companies in Hungary. Trade gradually 
shifted from the former markets of the Comecon towards the west: while sixty-five percent of 
trade was conducted with the Soviet bloc countries prior to 1989, by 1997 seventy percent was 
with the European Union, and eighty percent with the countries of the OECD. The strong 
export performance began to boost GDP growth and industry production, while inflation was 
brought under control, remaining under ten percent a year. 
Table: GDP, inflation rate, industrial production 
 
Year GDP* GDP % of 
previous year 
CPI as % of 
previous year 
Industrial 
production as % 
of previous year 
1991 2 498,3 88.1 135 81.6 
1992 2 942,7 96.9 123 84.2 
1993 3 548,3 99.4 122.5 103.9 
1994 4 364,8 102.9 118.8 109.7 
1995 5 614,0 101.5 128.2 104.6 
1996 6 893,9 101.3 123.6 103.2 
1997 8 540,7 104.6 118.3 111.1 
1998 10 087,4 104.9 114.3 112.5 
1999 11 393,5 104.2 110 110.4 
2000 13 150,8 105.2 109.8 118.1 
2001 15 274,9 103.8 109.2 103.6 
2002 17 203,7 103.3 105.3 102.6 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistics Office 
*in billion Forints 
 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
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